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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3715 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
AXEL GOMEZ, 
                           Appellant  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the  Eastern District of  Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-10-cr-00321-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 7, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 8, 2014) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
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 Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, Axel Gomez was convicted of various crimes, including 
21 U.S.C. § 841 (distribution of cocaine and heroin), 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy), 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking 
offense), and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon).  
On appeal, Gomez challenges these convictions on two grounds: (1) that police 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using pen registers and trap and trace 
devices without a warrant, and (2) that the evidence adduced at trial was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846.1  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
I. 
The DEA began investigating Gomez for drug distribution in 2009.  In May 
2009, the DEA arranged the sale of 20 grams of heroin from Gomez to a 
government informant.  This informant provided the DEA with the number to 
Gomez’s cellular telephone, and from July 9, 2009, to at least August 18, 2009, the 
                                                 
1  Gomez raises two other issues, but acknowledges that they are foreclosed by 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and United States v. 
Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), and presents them only for purposes of 
preservation.  They are: (1) his Fifth/Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he was 
exposed to greater punishment based on a putative prior conviction that was neither 
charged in the indictment nor proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the 
Commerce Clause does not authorize federal regulation of firearm possession based 
solely on the gun’s one-time travel in interstate commerce.   
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DEA used a pen register2 and a “trap and trace” device3 to monitor this phone’s 
activity pursuant to court orders issued under 18 U.S.C. § 3123.  These devices 
allowed the DEA to record a large amount of call data, such as the telephone 
numbers dialed by Gomez, the telephone numbers of persons who called Gomez, 
and the time of day and duration of these communications.  Importantly, all of this 
information was disclosed to Gomez’s cell phone carrier, Sprint Corporation, when 
the calls were placed.  This call data revealed that Gomez regularly communicated 
with suspected drug traffickers and individuals using prepaid phones, which 
suggested that Gomez was involved in the distribution of illegal drugs.  During this 
period, the DEA also successfully arranged and recorded multiple drug purchases 
from Gomez to confidential informants. 
Using the call data and the evidence obtained through the undercover 
purchases, the DEA obtained an order for a wiretap and began intercepting and 
recording Gomez’s cell phone conversations on August 24, 2009.  On September 
12, 2009, Gomez abruptly stopped using the tapped phone.  A confidential 
informant provided the DEA with Gomez’s new cell phone number and the DEA 
                                                 
2  A pen register records outgoing dialing information from the subject’s phone (i.e., 
what numbers the subject dialed, when he dialed them, whether the call was connected, 
and the duration of the call).  See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (defining pen register). 
3  A “trap and trace” device records incoming dialing information to the subject’s 
phone (i.e., when the caller dialed the subject’s number, whether the call was connected, 
and the duration of the call).  See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (defining trap and trace device). 
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obtained authorization for a wiretap for the new phone.  Both wiretaps yielded 
additional evidence that Gomez was engaged in the distribution of illegal drugs.   
Using all of the foregoing evidence, the DEA obtained and executed a search 
warrant for Gomez’s apartment, where they recovered almost $6,000 in cash, drug 
packaging materials and a digital scale, and a loaded .40 caliber handgun with an 
obliterated serial number.  Thereafter, Gomez was indicted on charges of 
distribution of controlled substances, conspiracy, and possession of a firearm in 
connection with drug trafficking. 
Prior to trial, Gomez moved to suppress the introduction of much of the 
foregoing evidence, arguing that the DEA violated his Fourth Amendment rights 
by engaging in extensive call pattern surveillance without a warrant.  The District 
Court denied this motion, concluding that Gomez’s argument was squarely 
foreclosed by Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
At trial, Government cooperators Raphael Pagan and Ramon Sanchez 
testified that they sold large quantities of heroin to Gomez on a regular basis.  
Importantly, they testified that they always sold Gomez heroin on credit and were 
not paid until after he distributed the drugs to his customers.  They also testified 
that Gomez occasionally sold them cocaine, and that they had sometimes helped 
Gomez cook crack cocaine. 
 The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts and the District Court 
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sentenced Gomez to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment.  This timely appeal 
followed.  
II.4 
 Gomez first argues that the DEA’s prolonged warrantless use of a pen 
register and trap and trace device violated his privacy rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.  We agree with the District Court that this argument is foreclosed by 
Smith.  Gomez provided a third party—in this case, Sprint—with all the data that 
the DEA obtained through the use of the pen register and trap and trace device.  In 
so doing, Gomez abandoned his privacy interest in this data because he “assumed 
the risk that the information would be divulged to police.”  Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.  
Although Justice Sotomayor has urged the Court to reconsider Smith’s holding that 
“an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties,” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring), we remain bound by Smith until a majority of the 
Court endorses this view.5   
                                                 
4  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s legal 
conclusions with respect to a motion to suppress.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 
336 (3d Cir. 2002).  When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and will sustain the 
verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
5  In the proceedings below, Gomez conceded that his position was “contrary to” 
Smith, but cited Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones for the proposition that “Smith 
is antiquated and must be reconsidered.”  J.A. 60.  Gomez presents a different argument 
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 Gomez next argues that the evidence presented at trial did not support his 
conspiracy conviction.  Specifically, he argues that the evidence demonstrated, at 
most, a “wholesale buyer-seller relationship” between himself and the 
Government’s cooperating witnesses—not a conspiracy.  Gomez concedes that he 
did not raise this issue in the District Court and, accordingly, that plain error is the 
proper standard of review in this appeal.  See United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 
372, 381 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we 
conclude that a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of a 
conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.  Pagan and Sanchez testified that they 
always provided Gomez with heroin on credit.  In the context of large-scale drug 
distribution, this fact alone provided the jury with sufficient evidence of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
on appeal.  Instead of urging us to overrule Smith’s “third party doctrine,” Gomez 
contends that this doctrine has already been “cabined” by five Justices of the Supreme 
Court—a number he reaches by combining Justice Sotomayor’s and Justice Alito’s 
concurrences in Jones.  Appellant’s Br. 27, 31.  As Gomez did not raise this argument 
before the District Court, it is waived.  Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 
336 (3d Cir. 2009).   
In any event, we reject Gomez’s contention that the concurrences in Jones 
“cabined” Smith.  Justice Alito’s concurrence did not explicitly seek to limit Smith, and 
indeed relied heavily on the fact that drivers of automobiles do not expect third parties to 
possess detailed, long-term data regarding their location.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, 
J., concurring).  By contrast, cell phone users do expect service providers to possess 
detailed, long-term data regarding the numbers they dial because this information is 
necessarily conveyed in the course of connecting a call.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.  By 
disclosing this data, cell phone users, unlike drivers of automobiles, “assume[] the risk” 
that a third party will convey it to law enforcement.  Id. at 744.  Therefore, we are not 
persuaded that the two concurrences in Jones have limited Smith to short-term call 
monitoring.   
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conspiracy.  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Additionally, these witnesses testified that Gomez sold them cocaine, and that they 
helped Gomez cook crack cocaine.  Accordingly, we see no reason to disturb 
Gomez’s conspiracy conviction.   
In light of the foregoing analysis, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.   
 
 
